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This is the first book, and in it the author has written of experi-
ence which is now far and lost, but which was once part of the
fabric of his life. If any reader, therefore, should say that the book
is "autobiographical" the writer has no answer for him: it seems to
him that all serious work in fiction is autobiographical-that, for
instance, a more autobiographical work than "Gulliver's Travels"
cannot easily be imagined.
But we are the sum of all the moments of our lives-all that is
ours is in them: we cannot escape or conceal it. If the writer has
used the clay of life to make his book, he has only used what all
men must, what none can keep from using. Fiction is not fact, but
fiction is fact selected and understood, fiction is fact arranged and
charged with purpose. Dr. Johnson remarked that a man would
turn over half a library to make a single book; in the same way, a
novelist may turn over half the people in a town to make a single
figure in his novel. This is not the whole method but the writer
believes it illustrates the whole method in a book that is written
from a middle distance and is without rancour or bitter intention.
-Preface to Look Homeward Angel by Thomas Wolfe
I
Introduction
Thomas Wolfe escaped suit by the people of his hometown of
Asheville, North Carolina, but not their disapprobation.' His pref-
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1. The book caused a furor in Asheville. So vivid were the characterizations that min-
isters denounced Wolfe from their pulpits, men met on street corners to complain about
their not-so-favorite son, and women devoted their social club meetings to tirades against
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ace presents the dilemma of a writer caught between inspiration
and potential litigation for libel. Despite the label "fiction,"
novels, short stories, and poems are often perceived as containing
at least kernels of fact. Characters concocted from the clay of the
author's life are held to be, in fact, representations "of and con-
cerning" actual people.2 Libel actions result from slender reeds of
recognition, even when the persona of the real person is almost
completely eclipsed by the imaginary attributes of the character.3
This article examines the problem of real people and writers of
fiction, a problem exemplified by three recent cases, Pring v.
the novel. Wolfe also received obscene letters and death threats. See T. WOLFE, THE STORY
OF A NOVEL 18-19 (1936). The people who populated his book resembled their real life
models both in name and behavior, and while the rest of the country had no idea who was
who, the residents of Asheville were all too aware of the correlation. See F. WATKINS,
THoMAs WoiE's CHARAcTERs 6-7, 9-11 (1957). The author knew that his work would
wound his former neighbors, but he also knew that not writing the book would signifi.
cantly injure him as an artist. In a letter to a friend he wrote, "I will soften all I can but I
cannot take out all the sting-without lying to myself and destroying the book." See E.
NOWELL, THOMAs WoLFE-A BIOGRAPHY 137 (1960). The young writer portrayed in Philip
Roth's 7te Ghost Writer (1979) faced a similar dilemma: injure his family by writing, or
sacrifice his main source of inspiration.
2. In common law terms, the "of and concerning" language is known as the collo-
quium. It is one of the elements to be proved in a libel action. Unless the plaintiff can
establish that the defamation refers to him or reasonably is understood to refer to him, he
cannot prevail. See W. PROSSER HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 746-51 (4th ed. 1971);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564 (1977); see infra text accompanying notes 125-33.
3. Wolfe himself was the victim of such a lawsuit later in his career when his Brook-
lyn landlord complained of a "portrayal" in the story No Door. Marjorie Dorman claimed
that she had been libelously depicted as Mad Maude Whittaker and asked for $50,000 in
damages. Her two sisters and their father joined in the suit, each claiming $25,000 in dam-
ages because Wolfe had written that Mad Maude's sisters and father were "all touched with
the same madness." See E. NOwELI, supra note 1, at 342. Because of the popular sentiment
built up against Wolfe over his first novel, Scribner's, the publisher and co-defendant, de-
cided to settle the case out of court. See F. WATKINS, mupra note 1, at 45-46. Wolfe, for his
part, regretted the settlement because of his conviction that such libel suits were "a part of
a great organized national industry of shaking down [authors] . . .and the only way to stop
it is to fight it, because it lives by threat and flourishes on submission." E. NOWELL, supra
note 1, at 344. What now is called the chilling effect had begun to give authors and their
publishers pause. Scribner's, in fact, had held up publication of The October Fair because of
the threat of another lawsuit. Id. at 343. Wolfe correctly realized that the chill on artistic
expression came not only from the prospect of paying damages, but also from the expense
incurred from merely defending such suits. He wrote to Charles Scribner, III:
I think that in that particular matter we were wrong in not fighting it. and fur-
thermore I think we were licked before we started, because our lawyers cost so
much we were practically forced to settle to protect ourselves against our own
lawyer's bills if we went on. Frankly, so far as I can see, we would have done as
well if we had had- and paid him fifty bucks. In the end, the three floors of office
space. ... the magnificent private offices, regiments of slick-looking assistants,
etchings of Abraham Lincoln, etc., did not mean a damn thing except trouble and
money- it was a sorry job.
Id. at 344.
No. 2] REAL PEOPLE AND FICTION
Penthouse International, Ltd.,4 Bindrim v. Mitchell,5 and.
Springer v. Viking Press.6 Pring was brought by an ex-Miss Wyo-
ming who claimed that a humor article in Penthouse Magazine
about a Miss Wyoming referred to and defamed her.7 Bindrim
was filed by a psychiatrist who conducted nude therapy sessions
and undisputedly served as the inspiration for a character in a
novel.' Springer sued for libel and invasion of privacy alleging
that a "whore" depicted in the novel State of Grace was of and
concerning her."
To be sure, the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants are
telling. Robbed of his source of ideas, the writer is rendered impo-
tent. If reasonably believed to share the unsavory attributes of a
fictional character, a real life model's reputation may be affected
no matter how much the author protests that the work is not
meant to be taken as the truth.1" Even so, the accepted legal test
is unduly protective of plaintiffs, although it is often expansively
applied to the defendant's benefit.1
It is accepted that to establish liability under the first amend-
4. 7 MEDIA L REP. (BNA) 1101 (D. Wyo. 1981), rev'd, 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982),
cert denied, 103 S. Ct. 3112 (1983). But cf. Miss America Pageant, Inc. v. Penthouse Int'l,
Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 1280 (D.N.J. 1981) (no showing of malice in defamation action brought by
beauty pageant arising out of same article).
5. 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979), reh'g denied,
444 U.S. 1040 (1980).
6. 90 A.D.2d 315,457 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1982), qffd, 60 N.Y.2d 916,470 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1983).
7. The article was entitled Miss Wyoming Saves the World... But She Blew the
Contest with Her Talent It attributed a proclivity toward sexual activity to the fictitious
contestant. See Miss America Pageant Inc., 524 F. Supp. at 1286-87.
8. The defendant, known to be a writer, was told that she could not enroll in the
plaintiff's nude therapy classes if she planned to use the experience in a novel. The defend-
ant assured the plaintiff she had no such intention and signed a contract to that effect.
Later, the defendant told her publisher about the sessions and subsequently completed a
novel entitled Touching, depicting a nude encounter class. Bindrim, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 69-
70, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 33-34.
9. Springer, 90 A.D.2d at 316, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
10. '"The question," as phrased by one court, "is not so much who was aimed at as who
was hit." Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 64,126 N.E. 260, 262 (1920), quoted in
Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1966). Thomas Wolfe framed the
nature of the problem after the furor caused by his first novel when he asked, "[Wihere
does the material of an artist come from? What are the proper uses of that material, and
how far must his freedom in the use of that material be controlled by his responsibility as a
member of society?" See T. WoLF, supra note 1, at 19-20. We believe Wolfe also touched
upon the solution contemplated by the first amendment that is, no liability should result
when a work of fiction is written "without rancour or bitter intention." Id
11. See RESrATMmET (SECOND) OF TORs § 564 (1977): "A defamatory communication
is made concerning the person to whom its recipient correctly or mistakenly but reason-
ably, understands that it was intended to refer." Comment d addresses the problem of
fictitious characters. See in/ra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
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ment a libel plaintiff must prove that the defendant was at "fault"
in publishing the defamatory material.' The Constitution has
been interpreted to require public figures and officials to prove
"fault" by demonstrating through clear and convincing evidence
that the author knowingly published a false statement of fact or in
fact entertained serious doubt as to its truth-the "actual malice"
requirement.' 3 In some states even private individuals must prove
"actual malice" to recover, although in most the constitutionally
compelled "fault" standard is satisfied if negligent publication of
false facts is proved. 14 The United States Supreme Court has
never decided what "fault" standard is appropriate in a fiction/
libel case.'"
The few fiction cases to be decided after the 1974 case of Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.,' in which the Court defined the constitution-
ally compelled "fault" standards for non-fiction, have focused al-
most exclusively on whether the publication was "of and
concerning" the plaintiff, a traditional element of the common law
tort of libel.'7 No court has recognized that "fault," as defined in
non-fiction cases, is inappropriate and unworkable in the fiction
context. The novelist admits "knowing" his material is false, as
fabrication is the essence of fiction. The author is not merely neg-
ligent in publishing the fictitious material, he does it intentionally.
Thus, the "fault" requirement, which is the primary source of con-
12. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
13. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme Court held
that in order to recover, a public official must show that the defendant knew the statement
was false or acted with reckless disregard as to whether it was false. This notion of fault
was extended to cases involving the defamation of public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), and to private individuals in Gertz.
14. See Annot., 33 A.L.R.4th 212, 221-31 (1984).
15. Commentators on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan felt that the issue of "art" and
libel would inevitably be addressed and perhaps altered. See, e.g., Silver, Libel, The "Higher
Truths" of Art and The First Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1065 (1978).
16. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). For a statistical analysis of those cases, see Franklin & Trager,
Literature and Libel, 4 COMM/ENT L.J. 205, 207 n.9 (1981).
17. Other common law components of a libel action are the inducement, the innuendo,
and the communication of defamatory words. If extrinsic evidence is necessary to establish
defamatory meaning, the pleading and proving of those facts constitutes the inducement.
The innuendo is the defamatory meaning of the words. See W. PROSSER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 968 (6th ed. 1976). Prosser provides an example:
[A] statement that the plaintiff has burned his own barn is not defamatory on its
face, since he was free to do so; but when it is pleaded as inducement that he had
insured his barn, and as innuendo that the words were understood to mean that he
was defrauding the insurance company, a charge of the crime of arson is made out,
which is defamatory.
W. PROSSER, 8upra note 2, at 748-49.
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stitutional protection in a non-fiction case, provides no shield to
the novelist or his publisher.
Proof of "fault," as it is traditionally defined, is a simple task for
the plaintiff, and the focus turns to whether the characterization
is "of and concerning" the plaintiff. Typically, that disputed ques-
tion of fact is left to the jury. We do not argue that the jury's
determination of this factual question is inappropriate. We sub-
mit, however, that leaving the "of and concerning" element as the
sole obstacle to liability is insufficiently sensitive to first amend-
ment principles."8 The "fault" requirement must be made mean-
ingful in the fiction context so that fiction writers have as much
first amendment "breathing space" as non-fiction writers.
In Section II of this article, we analyze the "origin of character"
to demonstrate that a novelist properly and necessarily draws
upon his acquaintances for character development, thus raising
the threat of libel. In Section III, we focus on three recent libel
cases to show how the traditional analysis of fiction/libel cases
threatens the artistic process and why a continuation of this trend
will result in uneven and uncertain results for authors and pub-
lishers, and inevitable self-censorship. In Sections IV and V, we
examine the various categories. Finally, in Section VI we con-
clude that if the first amendment interests at stake are to be prop-
erly balanced, the "fault" standard must be redefined to require
the plaintiff to prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the
defendant intentionally used the fiction device as a subterfuge to
defame the plaintiff and (2) did so with malice, that is, hatred, ill-
will, or spite.
II
The Origin of Character
"I am a part of all that I have met," said Tennyson's Ulysses.
19
18. The first amendment embraces more than political discourse. See, e.g., T. EMEP.
SON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970) (assuring self-fulfillment is a first
amendment function); Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 593-94
(1982) (first amendment protects individual self-realization). Even Justice Brandeis ac-
knowledged that the first amendment is designed to allow an individual to develop his
facilities and to derive happiness from so doing. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). . Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (nude
dancing is not without first amendment protection). See also Franklin, What Does "Negli-
gence" Mean in Defamation Cases?, 6 COMM/ENT LJ. 259 (1984).
19. The complete thought is:
Much have I seen and known, cities of men And manners, climates, councils, gov-
ernments, Myself not least, but honor'd of them all; And drunk delight of battle
No. 2]
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And so it is that the work of a writer reflects the parts that he has
collected throughout his life. Events and characters may be re-
fined and modified so that even the author would not recognize
them as resulting from real life. Nevertheless, real life exper-
iences are the source of all artistic inspiration. Understanding the
writing process is critical to appreciating the legal predicament of
the fiction writer; hence, this discussion of the realities of author-
ship precedes the analysis of the law.
A writer, states William Faulkner, requires three things: experi-
ence, observation, and imagination.'0 Thus, one of his tools in cre-
ating believable characters in credible situations is the
environment he knows.21 Even imagination, seemingly independ-
ent of experience and observation, is a function of sensory experi-
ence. The writer may conjure up a tale of a woman's suicide, but
at least he must know something about women and suicide to al-
low his creativity to act. He may, in fact, have known a woman
who committed suicide. Henry James, for example, was one of
only a few people who knew of the suicide of Henry Adams' wife,
Clover. The next year he wrote The Modern Warning,2 in which
a woman kills herself. Undoubtedly, Clover Adams' suicide
served as the impetus for the story, but the story is not about Mrs.
Adams. Rather, it is an example of James taking events from life
and transforming them into a story expressing his own emotions. 3
James would describe Clover Adams' suicide as the "precious
particle" of a work of fiction.2' It is the germ of the story-some-
thing seen, heard, heard about, or remembered.' For the British
with my peers, Far on the ringing plains of windy Troy. I am a part of all that I
have met; Yet all experience is an arch wherethro' Gleams that untravell'd
world ....
A. TENNYSON, ULYSSES 13 (1842). See also comment of Lord Byron (George Noel Gordon)
("I live not in myself, but I become/Portion of that around me. ). G. GORDON,
CHILDE HAROLD'S PILGRIMAGE, canto III, st. 72 (1812).
20. "[A]ny two of which, at times any 'one of which," Faulkner says, "can supply the
lack of the others." WRITERS AT WORK 133 (M. Cowley ed. 1958).
21. Id. For example, the birthplace of Henry James in New York, 21 Washington
Place, reappears in his novel Washington Square as the home of Dr. Sloper: "'a handsome,
modern, wide-fronted house, with a big balcony before the drawing room windows, and a
flight of white marble steps ascending to a portal which was also faced with white mar-
ble."' H. MOORE, HENRY JAMES AND His WORLD 7 (1974).
22. The book was written in 1886 but was not published until 1888. H. MOORE, supra
note 21, at 56.
23. Id. at 57. This was not the only example of a person from James' life becoming
reincarnated in one of his books. His horseback riding companion Lizzie Boott was the
model for his character Pansy in the 1881 novel The Portrait of a Lady.
24. WRITERS AT WORK, supra note 20, at 7.
25. Id. Family members often are the "precious particles." The young Unitarian min-
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writer Joyce Cary, the germ was the wrinkled forehead of a young
woman he saw on a boat, "a girl of about thirty, wearing a shabby
shirt. She was enjoying herself. A nice expression, with a wrin-
kled forehead, a good many wrinkles. ' 2  Cary said to a friend on
board, "I could write about that girl,"' but instead he forgot about
her soon after the boat completed its trip around Manhattan.
ister, the Rev. Mr. Babcock, with whom the hero of Henry James' novel The American
travels about Europe, was based on James' brother. James and his brother had themselves
traveled together in 1874. Upon reading the book, William James wrote to Henry about
"'the morbid little clergyman' ": "'I was not a little amused to find some of my own attrib-
utes in him-I think you found my "moral reaction" excessive when I was abroad.'" C.
ANDERSON, PERSON, PLACE AND THING IN HENRY JAMm's NOVELS 51, 52 (1977).
The families of Eugene O'Neill and D.H. Lawrence appeared in Long Day's Journey Into
Night and Sons and Lovers, respectively. O'Neill, however, directed that his play not be
published until 25 years after his death. His widow broke his wish by publishing it in 1956,
just three years after he died. John Cheever refrained from publishing his first novel, The
Wapshot Chronicle, until his father died in 1957. The book describes the material and spir-
tual decline of a New England family similar to his own. See Kakutani, Authors and Par-
ents-'Be More like Graham Greene, Dear,' N.Y. Times, Aug. 16,1981, § 7 (Book Review), at
3, 20, col. 1.
Autobiography, seemingly, is irresistable to authors. See, e.g., J. JOYCE, A PORTRAIT OF
THE ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN (1964); Nisly, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Southerner:
Flannery O'Conner's "The Enduring Chill" 24 CLA J. 43 (1980). The temptation is espe-
cially seductive to authors embarking on their first novels. See, e.g., Fetler v. Houghton
Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1966). The court catalogues the similarities between the
character Maxim, who cooperates with a Nazi organization, and the author's brother, the
plaintiff:
The novel depicts events in the life of the Solovyov family, composed of a father,
mother, and thirteen children of whom ten are boys and the third, fourth and
eighth are girls. This is the exact composition of the Fetler family. In the novel,
Maxim is the eldest child and is twenty-three years old in 1938; in life, the same is
true of plaintiff. In the novel, Maxim is a Latvian by birth; in fact, plaintiff,
although born in Leningrad, was a Latvian citizen at the time the events in the
novel occurred. In the novel, the father is an itinerant Russian Protestant minis-
ter whose wife and children perform as a band and choir where the father
preaches. Maxim is generally responsible for their temporal needs and to that end
dominates them. The family travels around Europe in an old bus. In fact, plain-
tiffs father was a Russian Protestant (Baptist) minister; the rest of his family gave
concerts as a family band and choir. Plaintiff looked after them, and they jour-
neyed through Europe during the 1930's in an old bus. Both families bought
homes in Stockholm.
Id. at 651. Nonetheless, the court overturned the granting of summary judgment on this
issue of identification. Id. at 654.
Because of this first novel syndrome, two experts have counseled publishers to scrutinize
writers' initial efforts carefully. Id. at 651-52 n.3 (quoting H. PILPEL & T. ZAVIN, RIGHTS
AND WRITERS: A HANDBOOK OF LITERARY AND ENTERTAINMENT LAw 23, 25 (1960)). Few
writers receive the warm response Bernard Malamud got after portraying a couple like his
parents in one of his first stories. Malamud mailed a copy to his father and his father
responded with a note signed "Sam," the name of the fictional grocer. See Kakutani, supra,
at'20.
26. WRITERS AT WORK, supra note 20, at 7-8.
27. Id.
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Three weeks later, at four in the morning on the other side of the
country, Cary awoke with a story in his head that had as its hero-
ine an English woman. As he revised the piece, he kept asking
himself, "Why all these wrinkles? That's the third time they
come in."8 Then, he realized that his English woman was the girl
on the boat. "Somehow she had gone down into my subconscious
and came up again with a full-sized story."' The wrinkles came
from real life, but the rest of the character came from Cary's
imagination 0
Far from denying the influence of reality on their work, most
writers readily admit it. French novelist Francois Mauriac,3" for
example, affirms the importance of sense perception. "Before be-
ginning a novel," he says, "I recreate inside myself its places, its
milieu, its colors and smells. I revive within myself the atmos-
phere of my childhood and my youth-I am my characters and
their world.
32
What sets the artist apart from the rest of us is his critical eye,
his acute perception of the world around him,' and his ability to
resuscitate the technicolor closeups long left in the recesses of his
mind. British writer Angus Wilson observed that the connections
are not always apparent, not even to the artist. According to Wil-
son, every character is a mixture of people the writer has known:
Characters come to me ... when people are talking to me. I feel I
have heard this, this tone of voice, in other circumstances. And, at
the risk of seeming rude, I have to hold on to this and chase it back
until it clicks with someone I've met before. The second secretary
at the embassy in Bangcock may remind me of the chemistry assis-
tant at Oxford. And I ask myself, what have they in common?
Out of such mixtures I can create characters.3
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Yet even the imaginary aspects of the character may have been based on still an-
other person. Norman Mailer has observed that "there's no clear boundary between expe-
rience and imagination. Who knows what glimpses of reality we pick up unconsciously,
telepathically." WRITERS AT WORK 268 (G. Plimpton ed. 1967).
31. Mauriac received the 1952 Nobel Prize for literature. His works include Le Baiser
au L46"ru (A Kiss for the Leper) (1922); Genetrix (1923); Thr&e Desquevroux (1927); and
Le Noeud de Viperes (Vipers' Tangle) (1932).
32. WRITERS AT WORK, supra note 20, at 42 (emphasis in original).
33. E.B. White, author of Charlotte's Web, alluded to this hypersensitivity in a 1952
letter to a fifth grade class in Larchmont, New York: "I didn't like spiders at first, but then
I began watching one of them, and soon saw what a wonderful creature she was and what a
skillful weaver. I named her Charlotte, and now I like spiders along with everything else
in nature." LETTERS OF E.B. WHITE 367 (D. Guth ed. 1976).
34. WRITERS AT WORK, supra note 20, at 260. In Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23
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Once transported into a work of fiction, the real person under-
goes a metamorphosis and a character emerges. The difficulty
arises when the character retains enough of the characteristics of
the real person to be recognizable. True, the character exists in a
fictional story, but the factual resemblances may lead readers to
believe that more came from the model. Norman Mailer, for ex-
ample, has admitted that the character Hollingsworth, in his novel
Barbary Shore,' came from "a vapid young American" he met in
Paris shortly after the publication of The Naked and the Dead38
"who inveigled me to have a cup of coffee with him in a caf6 and
asked a lot of dull questions. '37  Still, Mailer says, "there was
something sinister about him.
' 38
In the book Hollingsworth is a clerk for a stock brokerage firm
and is described in detail:
He had straight corn-colored hair with a part to the side, and a
cowlick over one temple. His eyes were small and intensely blue
and were remarked immediately, for his nose and mouth were
without distinction. He was still freckled, which made me wonder
at his age. I was to learn later that like myself he was at least in
his middle twenties, but there must have been many people who
thought him eighteen.39
Realistic? Perhaps. But reality ends when another character in
the book begins his description of Hollingsworth: "'A pretty sick
individual ... He's got a mind like a garbage pail. My private
opinion of him can be summed up in one word. He's a mad-
N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250 (1968), the widow of Ernest Hemingway contended that the
author's social interaction was susceptible to copyright. What was oral for Hemingway one
day, she argued, could become part of a written manuscript the next. Conversation for him
was said to be part of the literary process. The suit was against the author of a biography of
Hemingway that included excerpts from his conversational speech. The court found for
the defendant without having to reach the difficult question of copyrightability of conversa-
tions, holding that Hemingway had assented to their publication.
35. The book was published in 1951 and was Mailer's second novel.
36. The Naked and the Dead was Mailer's first book, published in 1948.
37. WRITERS AT WoRK, supra note 30, at 268.
38. Id. at 269.
39. N. MAILER, BARBARY SHORE 38 (1951). The description continues on a subsequent
page:
I discovered again how unusual were his eyes. The pupils were almost submerged
in the iris, and reflected very little light. Two circles of blue, identical daubs of
pigment, stared back at me, opaque and lifeless.
The sockets were set close together, folded into the flanks of his thin nose.
Front-face, he looked like a bird, for his small nose was delicately beaked and his
white teeth were slightly bucked. There was a black line between his gums and
the center incisors in his upper jaw, and it gave the impression of something artifi-
cial to his mouth.
Id. at 40.
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man.' ,,40 The potential for defamation is patent.41 The physical
description, most likely, is one of the actual American in Paris; but
surely Mailer did not mean that the real person was a madman or
even that someone thought he was. Something has intervened be-
tween reality and fiction. That something is the art of the author.
Art is the difference between the journalist and the novelist.
The former reports what is so. The latter takes what is so and
remakes it to suit his mold. The real life model, according to
James Jones, is merely the springboard.' Thomas Wolfe de-
scribed it as the clay of the writer.43 In Wolfe's view, an observer
might well say, "I know the farm from which you got that clay,"
but it would be unfair, he says, for that person to go further and
say, "I know the figure, too."44 Yet that is precisely why the plain-
tiffs in Pring, Bindrim, and Springer sought redress. The origin
of the clay-nude encounter groups in Bindrim, the Miss America
pageant in Pring, the academic setting in Springer-was undis-
40. Id. at 36.
41. An allegation of insanity likely would be considered defamatory. W. PROSSER,
supra note 2, at 739.
42. WRITERS AT WORK, supra note 30, at 241. Jones is the author of From Here to
Eternity.
43. T. WoLFE, supra note 1, at 22.
44. Id. at 23. Speaking of the reception given his book Look Homeward Angel, Wolfe
wrote, "Now I think what happened in my native town is that having seen the clay, they
became immediately convinced that they recognized the figure, too .... " Id. This trans-
formation from real life to imagination is the essence of fiction writing. In that respect, it
resembles the concept of "necessary distortion" in the visual arts, the process by which the
artist observes the world around him and then employs it to express his own point of view.
American artist Leonard Baskin describes this theory, first postulated by Jacob Landau:
Works of art in their myriad manners probe at reality. Reality is the totality of
human experience, nature, all personal-emotional relationships, the visible and in-
visible links and synapses, to wit, the structures of being. No artist can deal with
this whole; he does in fact apportion to himself a segment of reality. An example:
Two artists observe a sunset. One declares the sun is moving around the earth; the
other says, no, the earth is circling the sun. From an observable phenomenon the
wise artist employs distortion to achieve reality. Artists have universally and nec-
essarily distorted in achieving their vision. Not to distort is not to invent; not to
distort is not to magnify or diminish, or simplify or make complex.
L. BASKIN, ScuLp'ruRE, DRAWINGS & PRINTs 14 (1970).
As Baskin indicates, the goal of the artist, be he visual or verbal, is to portray some part
of the ultimate reality, not merely to reproduce a person or object. Depictions of people
from real life are altered and distorted and combined with others to achieve this objective.
See Hospers, Truth and Fictional Characters, 14 J. AEsTHETIc EDUc. 5 (July 1980). To the
extent that an author succeeds in this endeavor, a character in a novel may seem so lifelike
that real people seem to be imitations of him rather than the reverse. Id. at 9-10.
Nevertherless, while each characteristic of the character may be recognizable from real
life, the combination may be different from that found in any actual human being. Id. at 9.
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puted. The cases revolved around the plaintiffs' claims that they
knew the figures, as well.
Because a writer's descriptive powers may be so strong or his
insight into human nature so penetrating, the reader may believe
he recognizes an individual in a character when, in fact, the char-
acter is an amalgam of human types.' Yet, Joyce Cary believed
that the structure of a work of fiction prevented any character
from ever becoming a complete portrait of a real person. Real
people are too complex for books, he thought.
Look at all the great heroes and heroines, Tom Jones, Madame
Bovary, Anna Karenina, Baron Charlus, Catherine Linton: they
are essentially characters from fable, and so they must be to take
their place in a formal construction which is to have a meaning. A
musician does not write music by trying to fit chords into his
whole. The chords arise from the development of his motives.
4 6
Cary's comment underscores the most important aspect of fic-
tion for legal purposes-it is not true and it does not purport to be
true. It has a separate existence even though the impetus for cre-
ating that existence may have come from reality. Indeed, a legal
system that requires a writer to create characters divorced from
reality in effect requires him not to create at all, for that is the
ultimate source of imagination. 47 As E.B. White wrote to a child
fan: "Thanks for the letter. I don't believe I can write a book
about a horse because I don't know any horse.
'48
Related to the source of character types is the source of charac-
ter names. Real names may be applied to characters consciously
or inadvertently. The more closely the fictional character resem-
bles the real person with that name, the greater the identifica-
45. Many writers speak almost metaphysically about the transformation from actual
person to fictional character. British novelist E.M. Forster, for example, described his
"trick" of looking at a person with half-closed eyes, fully describing certain features. "I am
left with about two-thirds of a human being," he said, "and can get to work .... When
all goes well, the original material soon disappears, and a character who belongs to the book
and nowhere else emerges." WRITERS AT WORK, supra note 20, at 32-33. Similarly, Fran-
cois Mauriac says that a character almost always begins with a real person but changes so
much that sometimes he no longer bears the slightest resemblance to the model. The pro-
cess, he says, is one of crystallization around the person. Id. at 43.
48. Id. at 57. Cary's comments about the inability of a writer to portray a real person
fully resemble Leonard Baskin's remarks about the inability of a visual artist to capture all
of a scene. See supra note 44.
47. Norman Mailer, for example, says he may start with a real person but puts him in
situations that have very little to do with his real life. As a result, the model disappears.
His function is finished. What is left, according to Mailer, is only what is exportable in his
character. WRITERS AT WORK, supra note 30, at 269.
48. LETrERS OF E.B. WHTE, supm note 33, at 429.
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tion.a9 The more radically the fictional character differs from his
real life counterpart, the greater the chance for libel.'
Names, like personality traits, come from real people. Dorothy
Parker named her characters by consulting the phone book and
the obituary columns.51 The latter is relatively safe, as it is gener-
ally not possible to libel the dead.52 The former, however, is more
dangerous. Even so, the number of names is limited and an author
must get them from somewhere. E.B. White, for example, met an
Indian named Sam Beaver at a place called Camp Otter. He liked
the name, and years later gave it to a boy in his book The Trumpet
of the Swan.53 Francois Mauriac obtained his names from those
that were well-known in his part of France, around Bordeaux."
Perhaps more than any author, Thomas Wolfe discovered the
perils of allowing names of actual people and characters they re-
semble to converge. Wolfe's Bordeaux was Asheville, North Caro-
lina. He almost invariably used surnames prevalent there.5 In
some instances the names were changed, but not enough to ob-
scure their origin. Jeannerett became Jannadeau; Sternberg be-
came Greenberg; Bus Woody was transformed into Gus Moody;
and the Perkinson family was changed into the Tarkington clan."
Wolfe's method of naming characters may have been devised to
49. See infra notes 169-84 and accompanying text.
50. Falsity is an essential element of a libel action today, and must be proved by the
plaintiff. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 581A (1977). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 17, at 973. In colonial times,
however, the converse was true: the greater the truth, the greater the libel. Counsel for the
defendant urged a contrary rule in the trial of John Peter Zenger, who was accused of
seditious libel for criticizing the Governor General of New York. See J. ALEXANDER, A
BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW
YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL (n.p. 1735), reprinted in S. Katz ed. 1963. The Chief Justice, how-
ever, found the state of the law to be as described in 1 W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 194 (n.p. 1716): "It is far from being a justification of a libel, that the
contents thereof are true, or that the person upon whom It is made had a bad reputation,
since the greater appearance there is of truth in any malicious invective, so much more
provoking it is." Nevertheless, the jury found Zenger not guilty, "upon which there were
three huzzas in the hall." J. ALEXANDER, sup'ra, at 101.
51. See WRITERS AT WORK, supra note 20, at 79.
52. See 1 A. HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS § 199 (1969); cf infra note 145.
53. See LETTERS OF E.B. WHITE, supra note 33, at 87-88.
54. See WRITERS AT WORK, supra note 20, at 43.
55. See F. WATKINS, supra note 1, at 150-55. Wolfe later admitted that "the young
writer is often led through inexperience to a use of the materials of life which are, perhaps,
somewhat too naked and direct for the purpose of a work of art." T. WOLFE, supra note 1,
at 21. Nevertheless, one commentator has observed that his consistency in naming charac-
ters after real people "indicates that surely he must have enjoyed skirting the abyss and
making fiction as close to life as possible." F. WATKINS, supra note 1, at 9.
56. T. WOLFE, supra note 1, at 21.
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help him keep all the names straight in his head, but his reward
was the virulent reaction of his former neighbors.5 7
The nature of the writing process virtually guarantees similari-
ties between real people and fictional characters. Writers con-
sciously draw upon the people and experiences from their lives in
creating the people and places that populate their novels.'8 Addi-
tionally, the unconscious mind, with its storehouse of impressions,
generates fiction based on fact.59 By chance, authors conjure out
of their imaginations characters that closely resemble actual peo-
ple they have never met, seen, or even heard about. The current
libel standard, however, affords this sort of fortuitous occurrence
no additional protection. Thus, an author may be held responsible
for both the intentional and unintentional consequences of his
actions.
III
Pring, Bindrim, and Springer
The recent case of Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd, °
reveals just how easily the fiction writer can be held liable.
Kimberli Jayne Pring was a perennial beauty contest participant.
She represented the state of Wyoming on numerous occasions,61
including the Miss America pageant in 1978. She also was a baton
57. F. WATKnS, supra note 1, at 9.
58. See supra notes 1-57 and accompanying text.
59. Joseph Heller, in his novel Good as Gold, describes the dilemma through the cen-
tral character, an author, whose sister fears that she will become a character in an upcom-
ing book. The protagonist says:
I've got five sisters, one brother, three children, a wife, father, stepmother, and
more inlaws and nieces and nephews than I can keep track of. It's hard for me to
deal with any subject without coming close to some of them. If I do they're embar-
rassed, if I don't they feel snubbed.
J. HELLER, GOOD AS GOLD 87 (1979), quoted in R SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED
PROBLEMS 121 (1980). Sack notes that Heller's novel is dedicated to:




Help, conversations and experiences
play
so large a part.
R. SACK, sup, at 121 n.336.
60. 7 MEDIA L REP. (BNA) 1101 (D. Wyo. 1981), rev'd, 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982),
cert denied, 103 S. Ct. 3112 (1983).
61. Pring appeared as a contestant in the Miss U.S.A. Beauty Pageant, the Miss Black
Velvet competition, the Wyoming Miss Universe contest and represented the state at the
33d National Sweet Corn Festival. Pring, 7 MEDIA L REP. (BNA) at 1103.
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twirler of no small renown.'2 In 1979, Penthouse Magazine pub-
lished an article by Philip Cioffari, a free-lance writer and a pro-
fessor of English and creative writing.6" The article attributed
various sexual exploits to a Miss Wyoming who was a baton
twirler in a Miss America contest. Even though the writer testi-
fied that the work was fiction," and the editor65 and the publisher
thought it was fiction,' the United States District Court for the
District of Wyoming was not convinced, and denied the defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment. Citing comment d section
564 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,6 7 the court concluded
that "the question of whether or not a reader of the article in
question would understand that the character therein was in ac-
tual fact the Plaintiff, is a question for the jury."'
The Wyoming jury found that the story was "of and concerning"
Ms. Pring and awarded damages of $26.5 million, subsequently re-
duced by voluntary agreement to $14 million. Unlike the decision
of the trial court, which framed the threshold issue as whether the
plaintiff was a public figure,6 9 the defendant's brief on appeal
stated that the threshold issue was "whether Kim Pring, who was
Miss Wyoming, twirled a baton, and wore blue, may come forward
and claim that she is the 'Charlene' in the story and recover for a
defamatory imputation of indecent conduct.
'70
On appeal, lawyers for Penthouse argued that the verdict was
62. Pring won the title of Miss Majorette of Wyoming four times, received more than
50 baton twirling trophies, and appeared in several magazines. Id. Her public activities
were important because the defendants claimed that she was a public figure and that, ac-
cordingly, she should have been held to an "actual malice" standard of proof rather than
simple negligence. The district court, however, held her to be a private figure. Id. at 1104.
63. The facts recited in the Pring opinion are sparse; however, the decision in another
case arising from the same facts, Miss America Pageant, Inc. v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 524 F.
Supp. 1280 (D.N.J. 1981), provides additional background material. Id. at 1281.
64. Id. Such a disclaimer, however, is not dispositive under the Restatement test. See
infta note 113 and accompanying text.
65. 524 F. Supp. at 1285.
66. Robert Guccione, the publisher, admitted though that he did not read the article
until after its publication. Id.
67. Pring, 7 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 1104; see infra note 127.
68. Pring, 7 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 1104. The article was not labeled "fiction," but
rather "humor." Id.; Miss America Pageant Inc., 524 F. Supp. at 1285-86. Even humor that
is meant to be fictional, though, is not insulated from liability. In Salomone v. MacMillan
Publishing Co., 97 Misc. 2d 346, 351, 411 N.Y.S.2d 105, 109 (1978), the court quoted the lan-
guage of an 1831 Irish case, Donoghue v. Hayes: "'The principle is clear that a person shall
not be allowed to murder another's reputation in jest .... If a man in jest conveys a
serious imputation, he jests at his peril."' See also R. SACK, supra note 59, at 65-66, 244.
69. P ing, 7 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 1102.
70. See Tenth Circuit Hears Appeal of $14 Million Libel Verdict, 7 MEDIA L. REP.
(BNA) 2208 (looseleaf ed. 1981).
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improper not only because the author had not known the defend-
ant, but also because no reasonable person would connect the real
person with the fictional character.7' The article, they argued,
was a humor article, and was clearly labeled as such. Further, the
judgment condemning the article would threaten other humor
that alludes to real things such as the Miss America contest.72 The
events described put the world on notice that this was a work of
fiction. District Court Judge Oliver Seth asked the plaintiff's at-
torney, "What do we do with incidents that are so incredible that
nobody will believe them, even if the people are real?" The attor-
ney answered, "It's sometimes the absurd that hurts the worst.1
7 3
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the Pring
trial court in a two to one decision and directed the trial court to
set aside the verdict and dismiss the action.74 The United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari.75 The circuit court majority
broke down the "basic question" of the appeal into two parts.
First, it found that the matter of identity, that is, whether the arti-
cle was of and concerning the plaintiff, was "well developed in the
record" and "need not be discussed. '76 The court then based its
reversal on the second issue, "that the story must reasonably be
understood as describing actual facts about the plaintiff or her ac-
tual conduct."77 The court recognized that an argument could be
made that the "reasonably understood" requirement in this case
could be thought to be a jury question.7 The court, however,
ruled that the issue could and should have been decided as a mat-
ter of law.79 The court noted that the language complained of by
plaintiff depicted acts that were physically impossible, and thus
were "obviously a complete fantasy."'  Under these circum-
stances, the court held that as a matter of law no reader could
reasonably understand them to relate to statements of fact about
the plaintiff.8 '
Circuit Court Judge Breitenstein, in his dissent, argued that the
article contained both fact and fiction. The judge stated, "I con-
71. Id.
72. Id. Humor is not necessarily a defense. See aspra note 68.
73. 7 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2208.
74. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 443 (10th Cir. 1983).
75. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 103 S. Ct. 3112 (1983).
76. Ping, 695 F.2d at 439.
77. Id. at 440.
78. Id. at 442.
79. Id. at 442-43.




sider levitation, dreams, and public performances as fiction. Fella-
tio is not. It is a physical act, a fact, not a mental idea."82 The
dissent disagreed with the majority with respect to whether the
"reasonably understood" requirement could be dealt with as a
matter of law. Apparently, Judge Breitenstein would have re-
versed and remanded for a jury trial on the question of "reason-
ably understood.""
The Pring decision, like any difficult case, raises several ques-
tions. Can, for example, the case be limited to situations where
the fiction describes physically impossible acts? If Look Home-
ward Angel were litigated, where all of the events were indeed
"possible," should the jury get to decide whether the matters de-
picted therein could be "reasonably understood" to deal with
statements of fact about the plaintiff? If Look Homeward Angel
were permitted to go to a jury in Asheville, North Carolina, would
liability result? Is this a matter countenanced by the first
amendment?
While the Tenth Circuit in Pring appeared to treat the "reason-
ably understood" requirement as a matter of constitutional dimen-
sion, it did not address the question whether the "fault"
requirement imposed by New York Times v. Sullivan and its prog-
eny had been improperly addressed by the trial court.
In preliminary rulings, the trial court in Pring held that the
plaintiff was not a "public figure," and thus the plaintiff did not
need to satisfy the requirement of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
that the article be published with "actual malice."', However, the
court submitted the question of actual malice to the jury on the
issue of punitive damages." As Penthouse properly noted, how-
ever, "[i]n a case of fiction, the [New York Times Co. v. Sullivan]
standard must be cast in different terms. Otherwise, publishers of
fiction, who by definition know of [the story's] literal falsity will
be strictly liable .... ,,m Thus, Penthouse argued, the actual mal-
ice standard with respect to a work of fiction is "inappropriate and
totally misleading.""7 Penthouse claimed that with respect to a
work of fiction, Sullivan requires that there be clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the defendant "publishes with subjective aware-
82. Id. at 443-44.
83. Id. at 444.
84. See supra note 13.
85. Even a private figure must prove malice to recover punitive damages. Gertz, 418
U.S. at 350.
86. Appellant's Brief at 30, Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1983).
87. Id.
[Vol. 7
REAL PEOPLE AND FICTION
ness that the work will be understood as conveying a statement of
fact." 8
For private plaintiffs such as Ms. Pring, Penthouse argued that
the fault standard can only be satisfied if the plaintiff proves that
the "defendants failed to exercise due care in avoiding a publica-
tion which would be understood as depicting actual language and
conduct." The Tenth Circuit, however, never reached the issue of
"fault."
Thus, in cases like Pring, in which the fiction is also fantasy, and
in such works as Robert Coover's The Public Burning, in which
Richard Nixon makes love to Ethel Rosenberg on death row, the
"reasonably understood" standard does afford protection.8" But
what happens when a court confronts a novel that depicts events
that are possible and that holds the fictitious/real character up to
hatred, ridicule and contempt?
This was the issue in Springer v. Viking Press,9' involving the
novel State of Grace. Lisa Springer, the plaintiff, claimed that she
was the fictitious character Lisa Blake.9 Blake was described as a
"'whore' who engages in various types of abnormal sexual activ-
ity."9  Aside from physical similarities between Lisa Blake and
the plaintiff, the record indicated that the author had informed
the plaintiff that the relationship between Lisa Blake and another
character in the book was "loosely patterned" after their relation-
ship.9" The plaintiff discussed the plot with the author during the
book's initial creative stage and later reviewed the book for edito-
rial purposes." The record also contained a letter from a former
lecturer and teacher at Columbia University, the South African
novelist Nadine Gordimer, who had known both the plaintiff and
the author/defendant. The letter stated in part:
I have read Robbie's book and am absolutely amazed that he has
put Lisa into it-under her own name!---as a psychology student
who has become a high class prostitute. What a childish revenge!
She is described making torridly clinical 'love' to an Italian tycoon-
gangster who connives to have the Pope killed .... I wonder if
88. Id.
89. For a discussion of the legal implications of Coover's work, see Silver, supro note
15.
90. 90 A.D.2d 315,457 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1982), affd, 60 N.Y.2d 916, 470 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1983).
91. Id. at 316, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
92. Id., 457 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
93. Id., 457 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
94. Id., 457 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
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L. [Lisa] has read it?95
The trial court refused to dismiss plaintiff's cause of action for
libel and an appeal was taken.' The Appellate Division reversed,
holding as a matter of law that Lisa Blake and Lisa Springer were
not sufficiently similar. 7 The court held that "the description of
the fictional character must be so closely akin to the real person
claiming to be defamed that a reader of the book, knowing the real
person, would have no difficulty linking the two.""8 The New
York Court of Appeals reviewed the dismissal and in a two para-
graph, per curium opinion, affirmed. 9
Although Ms. Gordimer apparently had no difficulty linking
Lisa Springer with the fictional character Lisa Blake, Ms.
Gordimer's letter was cited only by the dissenting appellate divi-
sion judge-°° and not at all by the Court of Appeals.
The court also did not discuss the appropriate "fault" standard
to be applied, nor did it discuss Pring. Obviously the Pring analy-
sis did not assist the defendants in Springer, as the allegedly de-
famatory activity in Springer, unlike that in Pring, was indeed
possible. The Appellate Division's approach seems to balance the
similarities between the plaintiff and the fictional character on
one side, and their dissimilarities on the other, and then decide as
a matter of law whether a hypothetical "person who knew [the]
plaintiff" could confuse the two.' If the court deems them simi-
lar, presumably the case is submitted to a jury which is permitted
to make the same calculation.
The Springer court did set some standards. Superficial similari-
ties and a common first name are insufficient. But under the
Springer analysis, the author is given little guidance as to what a
judge or jury will deem sufficiently dissimilar. Should the artist
adjust his creative work to meet such a slippery standard?
To illustrate just how hazardous it is predicting what is a super-
ficial similarity and what is not, consider the case of Bindrim v.
Mitchell."2 Gwen Mitchell wrote a novel about nude therapy af-
95. Id. at 321, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 250 (Kupferman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added by
court).
96. Id. at 317, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
97. Id. at 319-21, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
98. Id. at 320, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
99. Springer v. Viking Press, 60 N.Y.2d 916, 470 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1983).
100. Springer, 90 A.D.2d at 321, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 250 (Kupferman, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 319, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
102. 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979), reh'g denied,
444 U.S. 1040 (1980).
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ter enrolling in the "Nude Marathon" session conducted by the
plaintiff, Dr. Paul Bindrim.lea The book, Touching, portrayed a
seamy session conducted by a Dr. Simon Herford. 1°4 The crucial
question was whether Herford was in fact Bindrim.
Undisputedly, Mitchell relied on what she saw at Bindrim's
class to generate ideas for her novel.1 05 Nevertheless, differences
did exist. The character Herford was described in the book as a
"fat Santa Claus type with long white hair, white sideburns, a che-
rubic rosy face and rosy forearms."'10 Bindrim had short hair and
was clean shaven. 10v Herford was a psychiatrist. Bindrim was a
psychologist, a Ph.D. rather than an M.D.' Indeed, of the three
witnesses who testified that they recognized Bindrim as Dr.
Herford, the only similarity mentioned was the fact that both
103. Bindrim knew that Mitchell was a writer and refused to allow her to participate in
the program if she planned to write about it in a novel. Mitchell assured Bindrim she had
no such intention and signed a contract that included the following language:
The participant agrees that he will not take photographs, write articles, or in any
manner disclose who has attended the workshop or what has transpired. If he
fails to do so he releases all parties from this contract, but remains legally liable
for damages sustained by the leaders and participants.
92 Cal. App. 3d at 69,155 Cal. Rptr. at 33. The trial court refused to uphold a damage award
based on the contract, and the appellate court affirmed on this point, observing that a pro-
fessional person, by contract or otherwise, cannot prevent a patient from reporting the
treatment he received. The law of libel, the court said, fixed the boundaries of the right to
report. Id. at 81, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
104. Id. at 69-70, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 34. The alleged defamation was the use of obscenities
by the fictional character. For a comparison of part of the novel with part of the actual
sessions, see infra note 116. Because Bindrim was a public figure, he was required to prove
"actual malice" on the part of the defendant, that is, knowledge of falsity or reckless disre-
gard of the facts. See supra note 13. The increased burden, however, had no effect because
Mitchell knew what had happened by virtue of having attended the sessions. Any diver-
gence from the reality was patent "actual malice." 92 Cal. App. 3d at 72-73,155 Cal. Rptr. at
35. The paradox, of course, is that by denying that the novel was of and concerning Bin-
drim, Mitchell admitted its falsity.
105. Id. at 69-70, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
106. Id. at 75, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
107. Id. at 76, 155 Cal Rptr. at 37, 38. The majority distinguished Bindrim from Mid-
dlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing Co., 413 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1969), in which the fictional char-
acter's life did not parallel the plaintiff's. The character, however, did have the same
unusual first name as the plaintiff, Esco. Id. at 142. Author and plaintiff grew up together,
but the writer successfully argued that the mere use of a name was not sufficient to consti-
tute portrayal. Id. at 143. In reality, though, readers may be more likely to connect a char-
acter with his real life namesake than with a real person whose name and physical
characteristics are completely different and whose only connection with the character is
the same occupation. This name/characteristics dichotomy does not appear to be a mean-
ingful basis upon which to decide liability for libel. For a discussion of the use of real
names, see itnfi notes 155-74 and accompanying text
108. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 75, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
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practiced nude therapy.' 9
Three witnesses, however, were two more than necessary to
prove identification. The majority approved a jury instruction
stating that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving "[t]hat a third
person read the statement and reasonably understood the defama-
tory meaning and that the statement applied to the plaintiff."'10
That instruction, however, contradicted the court's formulation of
the test as being "whether a reasonable person, reading the book,
would understand that the fictional character therein pictured
was, in actual fact, the plaintiff acting as described."'ll The dis-
tinction is critical. The latter language invokes an objective analy-
sis, the former, a subjective analysis. The dissent suggested that
the majority confused the test for publication, which requires
communication to only one person, with the tests for defamation
and identification, which the dissent believed are "to be tested by
the impression made on the average reader."" 2  The majority
avoided the problem, however, holding that the question was one
for the jury to resolve and was not susceptible to judicial review.l'
The dissent compared this paradox to that identified by a com-
mentator on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan:1
4
There is revealed here a new technique by which defamation
might be endlessly manufactured. First, it is argued that, contrary
to all appearances, a statement referred to the plaintiff; then, that
it falsely ascribed to the plaintiff something that he did not do,
which should be rather easy to prove about a statement that did
not refer to the plaintiff in the first place.
15
109. Id. at 86, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 43-44 (Files, P.J., dissenting). The dissent points out that
the plaintiff certainly was not the only practitioner of this type of therapy; presumably,
others using the technique also could have sued, claiming that they were identified. Physi-
cal resemblance, one should recall, was not important to the court's decision. As a result,
the Bindrim logic leaves open the anomalous possibility that an author might be sued by
several persons, all of whom claim that others recognize the character as portrayals of
them, and all of whom receive damages.
110. Id. at 87, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
111. Id. at 78, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 39. Accord Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing Co., 413
F.2d 141, 143 (4th Cir. 1969).
112. Id. at 87, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 44 (Files, PJ., dissenting).
113. Id. at 78, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 39. The court did acknowledge, however, that in some
cases the judge could determine that no reasonable person could make the identification of
the real human being with the character. In such instances, the court admitted, the jury
would not be allowed to consider the evidence itself. See, e.g., Greenbelt Coop. Publishing
Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y.
1978). However, in the court's opinion, this was not such a case. Bindrim, 92 Cal. App. 3d
at 78, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
114. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
115. Kalven, The New York irnes Case: A Note on the Central Meaning of the irst
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The dilemma is exacerbated in a case like Bindrim in which the
author readily admits finding inspiration from real life. Not only
does the writer assert that the information is fictional, he also ac-
knowledges knowing the truth of the matter. In Bindirim, for ex-
ample, Mitchell knew from attending the seminar that Bindrim
was not foul-mouthed. The fact that the fictional Herford did use
obscenities constituted the falsity of the matter asserted.116
Amendment, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 199, quoted in Bindrim, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 87,155 Cal.
Rptr. at 44 (Files, P.J., dissenting).
116. The Bindrim opinion reproduces the objectionable matter and the transcript of
part of the actual session upon which it appeared to be based.
Ezcerpts from 'Touching":
The minister was telling us how
the experience had gotten him
further back to God,
And all the time he was getting
closer to God, he was being moved
further away from his wife, who
didn't understand, she didn't
understand at all. She didn't realize
what was coming out of the
sensitivity training sessions he was
conducting in the church.
[Hie felt, he, more than felt, he
knew, that if she didn't begin coming
to the nude marathons and try to
grasp what it was all about, the
marriage would be over.
"You better bring her to the next
marathon," Simon said.
"I've been trying," said the
minister. "I only pray she comes."
'You better do better than pray,"
said Simon. "You better grab her by
the cunt and drag her here."
"I can only try."
"You can do more than try, Alex.
You can grab her by the cunt,
"A man with that kind of power,
whether it comes from God or from
his own manly strength he doesn't
know he has, can drag his wife here
by the fucking cunt."
"I know," Alex said softly, "I
know."
Bindrim, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 70-71, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
Transcript of Actual Session:
"I've come a little way,"
"I'd like to know about your wife.
She hasn't been to a marathon?"
"No."
"Isn't interested? Has no need?"
"I don't--she did finally say that
she would like to go to a standard
sensitivity training session
somewhere. She would be-I can't
imagine her in a nude marathon. She
can't imagine it."
"Why?"
'"either could I when I first
came."
"Yeh. She might. I don't know."
"It certainly would be a good idea
for two reasons: one, the minor one is
that you are involved here, and if she
were in the same thing, and you
could come to some of the couple
ones, it would be helpful to you. But
more than that, almost a definite
recipe for breaking up a marriage is
for one person to go into growth
groups and sense change and
grow ...
"I know that."
"Boy they sure don't want that, and
once they're clear they don't need
that mate anymore, and they are not
very patient."
"But it is true, the more I get open
the more the walls are built between
us. And it's becoming a fairly
intelligent place, a fairly open place,
doing moderate sensitivity eyeballing
stuff with the kids. I use some of




The constitutional "fault" requirement was squarely addressed
in Bindrim. The court found clear and convincing evidence of
"actual malice" because "Mitchell's reckless disregard for the
truth was apparent from her knowledge of the truth of what tran-
spired at the encounter, and the literary portrayals of that encoun-
ter. Since she attended sessions, there can be no suggestion that
she did not know the true facts. 11 7 The dissent characterized this
analysis as "absurd."""
Indeed, to expect works of fiction to be free of all vestiges of
reality is to propound a legal standard that cannot be met. Pring,
Springer, and Bindr'im demonstrate a variety of circumstances
and types of fiction whereby the author or publisher is vulnerable
to liability and damages-sometimes in large amounts. What the
defendant knew may be the crucial inquiry in a case of non-fiction
libel. But as to a work of fiction, which by definition purports to
be untrue, the more revealing question is what did the author in-
tend? The time has come for states to recognize fictional libel as
different in kind from non-fiction libel and enact laws that ad-
dress it directly.
IV
The Persistence of the Misplaced Question
The problem of libel in fiction represented by these three cases
arises in circumstances that can be roughly classified as follows:
(1) unintended similarity of a fictional character to a real person
by creation of characters from real people; and (2) use of names
and named people in fictional settings. A separate subspecies of
fiction/libel problems concerns fictionalization and the "new jour-
nalism.""' 9 To be sure, the categories overlap and include a spec-
trum of examples within each. This typology, however, allows an
examination of the different interests and degrees of culpability
involved in questions of identification and of how the "malice"
standard we suggest works in the context of the categories.
A. Common Law Elements
The proper initial inquiry in any allegation of libel is whether
the allegedly defamatory statement is "of and concerning" the
117. Id. at 72-73, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
118. Id. at 88, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
119. See infra notes 175-94 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff.' "The question," though, "is not so much who was
aimed at as who was hit."'2 1 Motivation of the author does not
mitigate identification. Rather, it serves only to mitigate damages
by barring those of a punitive nature.
22 Once the colloquium,1 23
to speak in common law terms, has been established, the plaintiff
must go forward and prove defamation, publication, fault, VA and
actual damages.
Section 564 of the Second Restatement of Torts presents a test
of liability in which the focus is on neither the publisher nor the
person about whom the words were spoken. Rather, the critical
inquiry is what a recipient thought about the words. If such a
third party reasonably believes that the statement was made about
the plaintiff identification is established, even if that belief is mis-
taken.125 Comment b to Section 564 underscores this fact. "It is
not necessary that everyone recognize the other as the person in-
tended," the comment states, "it is enough that any recipient of
the communication reasonably so understands it."'"
Another comment to Section 564, comment d,1 specifically ad-
120. See generally W. PROSER, supra note 2, at 749; R. SACK, supra note 59, at 120.
121. Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650,651 (2d Cir. 1966) (quoting Corrigan v.
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 64, 126 N.E. 260, 262 (1920)).
122. Fetler, 364 F.2d at 651.
123. See supra notes 2 and 17.
124. Today, the plaintiff is required to prove falsity as part of his prima facie case. See
Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 7 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1169 (6th Cir. 1981)
(falsity is an element of fault that must be proved and not presumed).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564 (1977) provides: "A defamatory communi-
cation is made concerning the person to whom its recipient correctly, or mistakenly but
reasonably, understands that it was intended to refer."
126. Id. at comment b (emphasis added). Comment b goes on to state, however, that an
important factor in determining the reasonableness of the belief is the number of people
who hold it. If only one person thinks that a portrayal of a real human being has occurred,
then the jury may well question whether that conclusion is justified. Nonetheless, the jury
certainly is able to find that one person's belief is reasonable and sufficient to support a
verdict for the plaintiff.
127. Comment d provides:
A libel may be published of an actual person by a story or essay, novel, play or
moving picture that is intended to deal only with fictitious characters if the charac-
ters or plot bear such a resemblance to actual persons or events as to make it
reasonable for its readers or audience to understand that a particular character is
intended to portray that person. Mere similarity of name alone is not enough; nor
is it enough that the readers of a novel or the audience of a play or a moving
picture recognize one of the characters as resembling an actual person, unless they
also reasonably believe that the character is intended to portray that person. If the
work is reasonably understood as portraying an actual person, it is not decisive
that the author or playwright did not so intend .... The fact that the author or
producer states that his work is exclusively one of fiction and in no sense applica-
ble to living persons is not decisive if readers actually and reasonably understand
244 COMM/ENT L. J. [Vol. 7
dresses the question of fictitious characters. The Restatement ap-
proach, though, is simply to treat such characters as a subspecies
of "identification" problems rather than as a discrete situation re-
quiring different rules. The only comfort offered by comment d is
the statement that mere similarity or resemblance is not suffi-
cient.128 Just as in other identification cases, the recipient-any
recipient-must believe that the character is intended to portray
the person.1" All of these matters, however, are for the jury to
decide. 3° The fact that six or twelve people are convinced by the
evidence that some person in the reading community might rea-
sonably believe that a work of fiction is of and concerning the
plaintiff, is too imprecise to withstand first amendment analysis
when that is the sole obstacle (as it typically is) to recovery. Most
works of fiction are susceptible under this standard to libel judg-
ments. The breathing room required by the first amendment is
not there.
131
While at first glance this "reasonableness" approach may appear
to be a proper method of adjudicating fiction libel cases, in fact it
raises more questions than it answers. For example, does reasona-
bleness vary depending on the familiarity of the recipient with the
otherwise. Such a statement, however, is a factor to be considered by the jury in





130. Courts are reluctant to preempt a jury decision by means of summary judgment,
especially in the light of liberal rules of pleadings such as Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 8 requires only: (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon
which the court's jurisdiction depends ... (2) a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief
to which he deems himself entitled. FED. R. Civ. P. 8. Despite the considerable burden of
defending such a suit, no additional pleading is required, at least not in federal court. See
Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 1980); Pirre v. Printing Developments, Inc.,
432 F. Supp. 840, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Thus, summary judgment for the defendant, which is
granted in federal court only when no genuine issue of material fact exists, is difficult to
obtain. So long as any person believes the fictional statement to be of and concerning the
plaintiff, courts most likely will consider the colloquium a fact for the jury to decide. See,
e.g., Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union, 619 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1980). But see Miss America
Pageant, Inc. v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 1280 (D.N.J. 1981). The federal standard
for summary judgment is set out in Federal Rule 56. Many state laws adopt the same "gen-
uine issue of material fact" test. See, e.g., TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A. Cf. Franklin, Suing Media
for LibeL" A Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 795 (summary judgment no
less common in recent years). See also Franklin, Winners and Losers and Wy: A Study of
Defamation Litigation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 455. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
131. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,271-72 (1964) (quoting NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
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purported victim? That is, may a close friend of the plaintiff, who
knows him, his life, and his mannerisms well, reasonably conclude
that a fictional character represents that person while a stranger
could not so conclude? Presumably so under the Restatement
test; yet such an approach puts a premium on resemblance, the
very factor comment d discounts."' The extent to which the au-
thor knew anything about the plaintiff is irrelevant.
Not only is the line between resemblance and representation
not a bright one, it is no line at all. Proof of the former is a neces-
sary component of a case alleging the latter. The Restatement test
allows authors little latitude to take ideas from real life. It sub-
jects them at least to a jury trial, and possibly to an unfavorable
verdict, even if the work in question is unmistakably marked as
being pure fiction.13 As a result, the writer is encouraged to make
his fiction as unrealistic as possible-a value judgment that may
create uniform law but also makes for bad literature.
V
Permutations of the Problem
Defamation, at least in what purports to be non-fiction, is an
untrue statement that subjects a person to public ridicule. Unlike
non-fiction, however, all fictional characters are admitted to be
false. Thus, disputes concern the identity of the person allegedly
defamed, not the truthfulness of the statement. Such matters
arise naturally from the process of fiction writing and take a vari-
ety of forms.
A. Unintended Similarity
The cause of unintended similarity is most troubling to a "rea-
sonable belief" system of libel. The first amendment, as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court, requires some fault by the defamer
to create liability.1 3' The problem arises because the "fault" stan-
dard for private individuals in non-fiction cases is negligence,1*
1M3 Se supra note 2n.
133. The use of a disclaimer stating that any similarity between characters in the book
and actual persons, living or dead, is strictly coincidental does not insulate the writer from
liability. Comment d to Section 564 of the Restatement specifically addresses this point.
Such a statement, it says, is simply a factor for the jury to consider in deciding whether a
reader's conclusion of portrayal is reasonable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRws j 584
comment d (19Mh.
134 See supm' note 1&
135 See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 580B (1977).
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and this may be proved by inference. "If the recipient reasonably
understood the communication to be made concerning the plain-
tiff," the Restatement states, "it may be inferred that the defamer
was negligent in failing to realize that the communication would
be so understood."11s
Thus, the Restatement collapses two distinct questions into one
and subordinates the constitutional requirement of fault to the
common law element of identification. Proof of indentification is
more properly viewed as an antecedent to an inquiry into fault, for
if identification is not established the plaintiff has failed to present
a prima facie case. Fault, far from being a matter inferred, is a
separate requirement of proof designed to prevent liability even if
the common law case has been established. As the court stated in
Gertz, "[t]his approach ... shields the press and broadcast media
from the rigors of strict liability for defamation."1 7
To ask whether an author was at fault for identifying a real per-
son perverts the fault requirement and transports it where it does
not belong. In non-fiction, the proper question is whether the de-
fendant knew or should have known that the information was
false. In fiction, however, the author admits that the material is
false. If he declares, as in Pringl8 that he never knew the real
person, then it makes no sense, constitutionally or otherwise, to
say that he is negligent for inadvertently writing about her. Even
if he acknowledges knowing the real person, he can hardly be
blamed for not knowing that certain readers-contrary to his in-
tent-would construe a character to be that person. Literature is
necessarily an interactive process, as is all art, in which the
reader's contribution may diverge radically from the author's in-
136. Id. § 564 comment f. Sullivan and its progeny dealt with fault attached to publish-
ing information that was untrue. The question in an "of and concerning" case involving
fiction is different. The writer of fiction not only admits the statements are untrue, he also
insists that they are untrue. Thus, comment f's approach extends the fault concept to a
new domain. The author's knowledge of the falsity of the statement is stipulated. His
fault, if there is fault, is in not knowing that a reader would connect the untrue and fic-
tional statement to a real person. In this regard his protection is more limited than his non-
fiction counterpart because, according to comment f, negligence may be inferred. Argua-
bly, a standard that allows such an inference is constitutionally infirm to the extent that it
diminishes the plaintiff's burden of production. A more provocative possibility, though, is
that the transportation of "fault" from the innuendo to the colloquium is improper. The
issue is reviewable to the Supreme Court, as it involves constitutional rights. See RESTATE.
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A comment g (1977).
137. Gertz, 418 US. at 348.
138. See supra notes 60-88 and accompanying text.
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tent.'s Imposing liability on the author for not anticipating the
reaction of a reader denies the independence of the reader and
incorrectly assumes a complete congruity of meaning.
If an author is blameworthy at all, it is not because of what the
reader thought, but rather because of what the author himself
thought. We argue below, however, that even the intent to use a
person's persona is not sufficient fault, for that too may be an im-
portant literary device. An author should only be culpable when
he intends to harm the person portrayed. At the very least, how-
ever, an author who is not shown even to intend to portray a per-
son, let alone injure him, should not be subject to liability.
B. Characters Based on Real People
Unlike cases such as Pring, in which authors inadvertently cre-
ate characters that resemble actual people, many cases involve
characters consciously culled from reality. They range from the
incidental use of one facet of an individual's personality to the ro-
man a clef, a novel in which fictitious names are attached to char-
acters meant to be understood as real people. To the extent that
the renaming is simply a subterfuge, a persuasive argument for
liability can be made. The problem, however, is distinguishing be-
tween the thinly veiled reference of the roman a clef and the le-
gitimate exercise of artistic license. A system that strives to allow
damage compensation in the former runs a significant risk of chil-
ling the latter.
Two motion pictures illustrate the value of the roman a clef:
Citizen Kane and Inherit the Wind. Citizen Kane is perhaps the
most compelling American film of all time. It has been exten-
sively honored, applauded, studied, and extolled.' 4° It is also obvi-
ously based on the life of an actual human being.
William Randolph Hearst loomed larger-than-life during his
lifetime.14' In 1898, for example, he cabled the artist Frederic
Remington in Cuba, saying, "You furnish the pictures, I'll furnish
the war."'" Hearst presided over a publishing empire built upon
the San Francisco Examiner, a paper he led from shabby quarters
139. See generally S. FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980). This is so even in
law. See generally Symposium, Law As Literature, 60 TEX L REv. 373-58 (1982).
140. See generally Focus ON CiTZEN KANE (R. Gottesman ed. 1971); P. KAF, THE CM-
ZEN KANE BOOK (1971).
141. See generally C. OLDER, WILLiAm RANDOLPH HEARST, AMERICAN (1936).
142. J. BARTLEtt, FAMILUAR QUOTATIONS 702 (15th ed., E. Beck el. 1980).
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to economic prominence. 43 With his riches, he built San Simeon,
a huge estate on the California Coast.144
The principal character of Citizen Kane, Charles Foster Kane,
also loomed larger-than-life. He, too, told an employee that he
would furnish the war. He also built a publishing empire from a
floundering newspaper and constructed a mansion with his
money. Hearst was a real person, while Kane was his fictional
counterpart; no one could fail to recognize that. Yet Charles Fos-
ter Kane had some personal shortcomings that were not necessar-
ily inspired by the real life model. Kane's sexual life resulted in
public scandal, which in turn cost him an election. Should that
attribute be associated with Hearst as well? If so, how could Or-
son Welles have escaped liability for the contents of an acclaimed
masterpiece? The easy answer is by waiting until Hearst died.145
But that merely avoids the difficult core question: was Welles'
film proper? If not, is the loss to the public (i.e., the possibility of
the film not being made or of being tampered with by a battery of
media lawyers) greater than the damage to the individual? How
should those interests be balanced? Surely not on a scale of artis-
tic quality, for that is a determination for which courts are un-
suited and ill-equipped.14
Similarly, the film Inherit the Wind was based on actual events,
and it also represents only a thinly veiled attempt to disguise the
143. C. OLDER, sUpra note 141, at 70-71.
144. Id. at 527.
145. Libel, because it is a personal injury, does not survive death in a majority of Ameri-
can jurisdictions. See 1 A. HANSON, supra note 52, at 164-65. But see Canino v. New York
News, Inc., 96 N.J. 189, 475 A.2d 528 (1984) (action survives in New Jersey). Rumors of
sexual impropriety did in fact circulate during Hearst's lifetime. See 0. CARLSON, LORD OF
SAN SIMEON 147 (1970).
146. In copyright cases, courts have been reluctant to require that works of art satisfy
anything more than a minimal test of quality to enjoy copyright protection. In Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., a case questioning the originality of lithographed circus pos-
ters, the Supreme Court stated:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to consti-
tute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the
narrowest and most obvious limits. At one extreme some works of genius would
be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until
the public had learned the new language in which their author spoke. It may be
more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of
Manet would have been sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the
other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less
educated than the judge. Yet if they command the interest of any public, they
have a commercial value-it would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic
and educational value--and the taste of any public is not to be treated with
contempt.
188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).
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person portrayed. The historical genesis of Inherit the Wind was
the case of State v. Scopes, 47 more commonly called the Scopes
Monkey Trial.'" The real life characters were colorful enough to
have been created by a fiction writer. On one side: William Jen-
nings Bryan, perhaps the best known politician of his day, an old-
time stump speaker and advocate of biblical creationism. On the
other: Clarence Darrow, an acerbic, cynical courtroom lawyer and
defender of the right to teach evolution. 49 The issue: science ver-
sus religion. Never did a novelist weave a more compelling scena-
rio than that spun out of this reality.
In the film, William Jennings Bryan became Matthew Harrison
Brady. Clarence Darrow was renamed Henry Drummond. The
issue, though, was the same, and much of the dialogue came di-
rectly from the transcript of the trial.1' Nevertheless, not all of
Inherit the Wind was inherited from reality. Nuances were ad-
ded; personality traits were modified, and some of the changes
could have been considered defamatory. In the film, for example,
the father of the protagonist's girlfriend is portrayed as a particu-
larly callous and cruel clergyman. He denounces his daughter
publicly and vociferously. Gene Kelly, who played a newspaper-
man meant to be H.L. Mencken, presents a picture of a journalist
who could be considered unprofessional: he actively consorts with
the defense. The point is not that the material was definitely de-
famatory or even that it was untrue, but rather, that under the
existing test of libel, the issue was at least worthy of litigation. To
the extent that such litigation would have convinced others to
abandon similar projects, the public would have been deprived of a
most worthwhile marriage, the union of fact and fiction, and the
author would have been punished for the success of his endeavors.
A test for fictional defamation based on intent to use fact might
be proposed, but it would not adequately protect the author who
does indeed intend to use reality as the basis for his work. The
Bindrim case and the two films discussed above illustrate this in-
adequacy. Undoubtedly, some writers do mean to report actual
occurrences using the vehicle of fiction to score their artistic and
147. No. 5231, 5232 (Circuit Ct., Rhea County, Tenn. 1925), offd, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn.
1927).
148. See generally L DECAMP, THE GREAT MONKEY TRiAL (1968); S. GREBSTEIN, MON-
KEY TRIAL (1960).
149. See generally BRYAN AND DARROW AT DAYTON (L Allen ed. 1967).
150. Transcripts of the trial can be found in S. GREBSTEIN, supra note 148, at 32, and in




political points.15  In Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co. ,152 the writer
consciously and maliciously manipulated reality to make a real
person appear worse than he actually was. As we propose in the
final section, the writer who uses the fiction device as a subterfuge
to defame real people and does so with "malice," in its common
law sense, should be held liable.1 But the plaintiff must prove
two things by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the defend-
ant intentionally used the fiction device as a subterfuge to defame
the plaintiff; and (2) that the defendant did so with malice.
The Restatement of Torts says liability can occur when any per-
son reasonably recognizes a fictional character as representing a
real person.154 The question that arises, however, is whether any
such recognition is reasonable. Certainly, people may see a work
of fiction and connect it to reality, wondering if the two coincide.
"Wondering," however, is not a proper basis for defamation, espe-
cially when one considers the first amendment interests at stake.
Arguably, once the label "fiction" is attached to any work of liter-
ature, a reader connot reasonably believe that any of it is true.
The fact that some of it may be true should not imply that any-
thing else about it is also true. A legal system that permits such
inferential logic closes off the writer's principal source of inspira-
tion-reality. The effect is felt whether the ultimate congruence
of fiction to fact is intentional or accidental.
C. Real Names in Unreal Settings
Unlike Dorothy Parker, who got the names of her characters
from phone books and obituary columns," Orlando Petrocelli
found his names in the office. Petrocelli wrote a potboiler entitled
Match Set about a transsexual tennis player competing in the wo-
men's professional tennis circuit." The central character was
151. Truman Capote admits as much in describing his first writing--an article for a chil-
dren's page contest sponsored by the Mobile, Alabama Press Register.
I had been noticing the activities of some neighbors who were up to no good, so I
wrote a kind of roman a clef called "Old Mr. Busybody" and entered it in the
contest. The first installment appeared one Sunday, under my real name of Tru-
man Steckfus Persons. Only somebody suddenly realized that I was serving up a
local scandal as fiction, and the second installment never appeared.
WRITERS AT WORK, supra note 20, at 286-87.
152. 228 N.Y. 58,126 N.E. 260 (1920). See also infra notes 206-12 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 197-212 and accompanying text.
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564 comment b (1977). See supra text accom-
panying note 126.
155. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
156. Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 638 (2d Cir. 1980).
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named Melanie Geisler, as was a former associate of the author at
a small publishing house. The latter, presumably not a transsex-
ual, sued.
In Geisler v. Petrocelli,1'57 the defendant moved for dismissal
and was successful in the trial court.'m The court ruled that no
reasonable reader could mistake the real Ms. Geisler for the fic-
tional one,159 because the book was clearly labeled "fiction."'" On
appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, ruling that the "of and con-
cerning" issue was a question for the jury and that the plaintiff
had pleaded sufficient facts to withstand the motion for
dismissal.' 6 '
Geisler further illustrates the broad impact of conditioning lia-
bility on recognition by only one person. Surely, the author was
not writing a book about his co-worker. Her name simply was
convenient, even if use of it was ill-advised. Yet the Second Cir-
cuit held that "[i]t is not necessary that all the world should un-
derstand the libel; it is sufficient if those who knew the plaintiff
can make out that [she] is the person meant."'1 2
The word "meant" is the lynchpin of the decision. The court
seemingly construes it to signify something less than a portrayal,
which is the standard set forth by the Restatement.'63 Mere simi-
larity of name or resemblance is not sufficient.' e6 Without a
doubt, Petrocelli meant the name of his fictional character to be
Melanie Geisler, and he almost certainly meant their physical
characteristics to be similar.'6 But he did not mean the tennis
player to be the real person, only to share some of her attributes.
The approach of the Second Circuit, though, makes no such dis-
tinction. This confusion unfairly requires the writer to divorce his
characters from reality.
The court in Geisler alludes to the fact that the plaintiff and the
157. Id.
158. Id. at 637.
159. Id. at 639.
160. The book also contained a standard disclaimer stating that any resemblances be-
tween its characters or episodes and real persons or actual incidents were coincidental. Id.
at 638.
161. Id. at 640
162. Id. at 639. But cf. Kocza v. Avon, 7 MEDIA REP. (BNA) 1919 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981)
(fleeting and incidental use of name that is substantially similar to plaintiff's in novel does
not violate New York privacy statute; motion to dismiss granted).
163. RETATEmENT (SECOND) OF TOTS § 564 comment d (1977). See supra note 127.




defendant worked together.166 The implication is that this makes
the innuendo more likely; but access alone is insufficient to prove
the plaintiff's case.6 7 Presumably, Melanie Geisler would be no
less damaged if Orlando Petrocelli had never met her but used her
name nonetheless. Geisler argued that her friends knew that she
worked with Petrocelli, so they were more likely to believe that
she was in fact the transsexual tennis player.168 This deduction,
however, stacks the deck against the author. Either the fictional
character portrays the real person objectively or she does not.
Had the character been a Melanie Geisler who worked in a pub-
lishing house, the belief that she was a portrayal of the actual Gei-
sler would have been more defensible. The person in the book,
however, had a completely different life. Further, the same
friends who knew that Geisler worked in a publishing house with
Petrocelli obviously knew that she was not a professional tennis
player. Thus, her casual association with the author cut against
her case as well.
A related problem involving names of actual people arises when
an author places a well-known person in a fictional story. One
commentator cites the book The Public Burning, in which ex-
President Richard Nixon becomes involved in an attempt to se-
duce Ethel Rosenberg. 6 9 Nixon, so far as we know, did no such
thing. The author's defense in such a case is tortuous. He did use
Nixon's name, and he did mean to refer to that Richard Nixon. He
did not mean to say, though, that the events actually occurred.
Rather, the actual person in such a work of fiction is nothing more
than another character. He happens to be real, but his exper-
iences in the book are not.
This type of literary device shifts the focus from "of and con-
cerning" to a subspecies of that element, namely, whether the
publication contains false statements of fact about the plaintiff.
No author reasonably can argue that the colloquium has not been
met in such a case. He has been shorn of all of his defenses: the
similarity of personalities and names is not coincidental, and the
name and characteristics are not used simply as springboards. In-
deed, a reasonable person could only conclude that the character
and the real life person are one and the same. 7 0 Thus, a writer is
166. Id.
167. See supra note 17.
168. 616 F.2d at 634.
169. See Silver, supra note 15, at 1068. See generally R. SACK, supra note 59, at 242.
170. See aupra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
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reduced to a sleight-of-hand denial of defamation by pointing out
that even though the character and the person have the same
name, the material is not defamatory because it is clearly marked
"fiction." No one, an author would argue, should believe that
these fictional events actually occurred in the life of the real
person.
171
A short story by Truman Capote displays another facet of the
"real person in unreal situations" dilemma. In La Cote Basque
1965,1 two persons are having a gossipy conversation at a restau-
rant in New York when in walk Jacqueline Kennedy and Lee
Radziwell. The potential defamation results not from what the
Bouvier sisters do, but rather from what the two diners say about
them:
"Isn't that," Mrs. Matthau, offering a diversion, "Jackie Kennedy?
and her sister?"
Lady Ina observed, "You can see those girls have swung a few
big deals in their time. I know many people who can't abide either
of them, usually women, and I can understand that, because they
don't like women and almost never have anything good to say
about any woman. But they're perfect with men, a pair of West-
ern geisha girls; they know how to keep a man's secrets and how
to make him feel important. If I were a man, I'd fall for Lee my-
self. She's marvelously made, like a Tanagra figurine; she's femi-
nine without being effeminate; and she's one of the few people I've
known who can be both candid and cozy-ordinarily one cancels
the other. Jackie-no, not on the same planet. Very photogenic,
of course; but the effect is a little . . . unrefined, exaggerated.'
173
Who is speaking? Is it Capote or his fictitious diners? Even if it
is the diners, should an author have the right to publish arguably
defamatory statements about real people simply by putting the
words in the mouths of made-up characters? One might argue
that the Capote excerpt is not truly defamatory-that it is within
the realm of fair comment or opinion.' 74 That, however, only
171. If the real person happens to be a public official or a public figure, the plaintiff will
be required to prove New York Times malice. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
172. EsQuiRE, Nov. 1975, at 110.
173. Id. at 112.
174. Opinions, that is, evaluative statements, as opposed to assertions of fact, are pro-
tected by the first amendment. Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284-86 (1974);
Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 14 (1970). The Bouvier sisters cer-
tainly qualify as public figures, although perhaps unwillingly nowadays. See Galella v.
Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973) (court enjoins photographer who persists in taking pic-
tures of Jacqueline Kennedy from coming within 25 feet of her). Consequently their lives
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avoids the central problem. Capote's characters could have been
more base in their remarks. Let us suppose that one of them ac-
cused the sisters of being unfaithful to their husbands. The words
may then be considered defamatory. The colloquium is clear. Is
there any defense? Perhaps. The writer might contend that be-
cause fictional characters are speaking, their comments are not to
be regarded as actually depicting the truth. In a case like Pring,
where the fictional Miss Wyoming performs fellatio on her coach
causing him to levitate before a national television audience, the
court may have no trouble saying, as a matter of law, that no per-
son could reasonably believe that this fact actually occurred. But
when a more realistic set of events is described, such as those de-
scribed in La Cote Basque 1965 or Look Homeward Angel, the jury
decides.
Therefore, the writer must convince the finder of fact that state-
ments by fictional characters exist in a third dimension-they are
neither true nor untrue, but rather unreal. It is an esoteric argu-
ment, but not a nonsensical one. The nature of libel is that an
individual's reputation has been impugned, and the author may
assert that no damage has occurred because no actual person made
the statement. Thus, a reader could not reasonably believe that it
was intended to say anything about the real person purportedly
being discussed. So, when a character says Ms. A is a whore, the
reasonable reader must confine this statement to the context of
the fictional story. As to whether Ms. A really is a whore or not,
the author expresses no opinion.
D. Fictionalization
While closely related, fictionalization and the "new journalism"
are not identical. The distinction is easier to state than to apply,
but it appears to be based on the ultimate intent of the author. A
fictionalized work is one that uses fact as a springboard for a good
made-up story.17 The new journalism, on the other hand, uses
the techniques of fiction writing in an attempt to make the facts
are subject to a greater amount of scrutiny in the press. But see Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
U.S. 448 (1976) (the Court decided that a wealthy society woman, whose divorce decree was
held to have been misreported by Time Magazine, was not a public figure). While Jacque-
line Kennedy may have been a true public figure as First Lady, at some point her status
may have changed. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (person in.
volved in Soviet espionage investigation 26 years before no longer a public figure).
175. One example of fictionalization might be the work of Oscar Lewis. Lewis por-
trayed the lives of the poor of Mexico in THE CHILDREN OF SACHEZ (1961), and the poor of
Puerto Rico in LA VIDA (1966). He tape-recorded monologues of his subjects telling the
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more comprehensible.17 The difference, while subtle, is crucial to
determining liability for libel. The former should be considered a
work of fiction; the latter will be more likely taken as factual. Ac-
cordingly, we include fictionalization, but not the new journalism,
in our proposal for a new test of fault in fiction.
The case of Sliwa v. Highgate Pictures177 provides an interesting
example of the nature of fictionalization in an unusual context.
The case arose as an action on a contract. Curtis Sliwa, founder of
the group that grew into the Guardian Angels,"'8 signed a contract
with Highgate Pictures to produce a made-for-television film
based on his life and his organization. The contract allowed the
defendant to depict Sliwa's story either in a fictionalized account
or in a factual manner. The company chose the former and Sliwa
sued over its deviation from the truth.
Judge Greenfield, of the New York Supreme Court, held that
the film did not depart markedly from reality, and thus did not
violate the contract. In his opinion, Judge Greenfield also dis-
cussed the difference between fiction and fictionalization and the
limits of the latter.
Fiction, is a work of the imagination, which is the event, incidents,
characters and descriptions [coming] from the author's brain....
When we talk about fictionalizing, we start with an essential body
of facts taken from the reality and we then proceed along the road
so that what we wind up with is an end product somewhere be-
tween fact and fiction. The origin and inspiration of the work is
clear, but not all the characters, dialogue or events may wholly
correspond to reality.
179
stories of their lives and then fictionalized them, heightening the dramatic impact. See J.
HOLLOWELL, FACT AND FICTION 11 (1977).
176. Tom Wolfe, one of the leading exponents of the new journalism, wrote that the
new journalism made it possible "in non-fiction, in journalism, to use any literary device,
from the traditional dialogisms of the essay to stream-of-consciousness, and to use many
different kinds simultaneously, or within a relatively short space ... to excite the reader
both intellectually and emotionally." T. WOLFE, THE NEw JOURNALISM 15 (1973).
177. 7 MEDiA L. REP. (BNA) 1386 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
178. The group originally called itself "The Magnificent Thirteen," and became organ-
ized on February 13, 1979, for the purpose of patrolling the New York subways in an at-
tempt to reduce the number of muggings. Id. at 1386-87.
179. Id. at 1387-88. Sliwa and other cases of fictionalization are distinguishable from
cases such as Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840,286 N.Y.S.2d 832
(1967), in which the author fictionalized the life story of a baseball player but published it
as a biography. When a false story is presented as true, libel is much more likely. In con-
trast, cases like Shwa involve works that do not purport to be true. Both, however, are
subjected to the same legal analysis for the question of whether they are "of and concern.
ing" the plaintiff. The impropriety of that symmetry. would be remedied by the approach
suggested in Part VI of this article.
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The question in Sliwa was not whether the plaintiff had been
defamed, but whether he had been cheated out of a reasonably
accurate representation of his life. The court held that he had not.
The actual events, the court concluded, were simply means to an
end-a model that the dramatists were free to cut, clothe, and dec-
orate as they saw fit.' s° Yet this artistic license was subject to cer-
tain limits; the defendants were not free to "take the skeleton of a
dinosaur and portray it as a mouse."181 This restriction, however,
was based on the contract. The corollary contention in a libel case
might be that the writers would not be free to alter reality so
greatly as to defame the real life characters who, as in Sliwa, may
be named.
The remedy in such a libel action, however, could be the same as
the solution in the Sliwa case: proper labeling. The judge sug-
gested the following disclaimer:
This story was inspired by the life and deeds of Curtis Sliwa, of the
Bronx, New York, and of the group he organized, the Magnificent
Thirteen, which later evolved into the Guardian Angels.
For the purposes of dramatization, names have been changed,
characters created, and incidents devised or altered, and this pro-
duction does not purport to be a factual record of real events or
real people.1
8 2
The idea of labeling is not at all foreign to American jurispru-
dence as a remedy to prevent confusion. In fact, it is the most
common solution to cases of unfair competition.- 3 In unfair com-
petition, the problem is the possibility that the public will not dis-
tinguish between two similar products, pole lamps for example.1 4
In fictionalization, the problem is that the public will not distin-
guish between a fictional story that resembles fact and the actual
facts. Just as the proper remedy in the former instance is not to
take the pole lamp off the market, the proper approach in the lat-
180. 7 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 1389.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1392-93. The film already included a disclaimer at its head, stating that every-
thing in it was fictitious, but the court was concerned about the fact that that was not so.
Some facts as stated in the work were true. Indeed, that was necessary to fulfill the con-
tract. The revised disclaimer puts the public on notice that while some of the events are
accurate representations of reality, others are not.
183. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964) (state can require
proper labeling of unpatentable pole lamps); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376
U.S. 234, 238-39 (1964) (state can require proper labeling of unpatentable lighting fixture).
See also Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120-21 (1938) (label was suffi-
ciently prominent to minimize possibility of confusion).
184. Competing pole lamps were the objects in question in Stiffel. See supra note 183.
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ter is not to ban such stories. Rather, the second lamp manufac-
turer and the fictionalization writer should both be required to
clearly label their products as suggested in Sliwa. That way, the
public receives the benefit of both products and also knows the
1difference between them and the originals.
For purposes of this discussion, fictionalization is restricted to
works that preserve the actual names of the real life characters. It
is this feature that distinguishes fictionalization from the roman a
clef.l"5 Unlike the author of a roman a clef, the writer of a fiction-
alized story generally cannot defend himself on the basis of no col-
loquium. He is usually limited to his no-defamation contention.
Thus, the associate justice of the Michigan Supreme Court who
wrote the novel Anatomy of a Murder could plead that a character
in his book did not refer to her real life counterpart, even though
the story was quite similar to the actual events.'l s
The plaintiff in Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co.18 7 was only a mi-
nor player in the actual events and in the novel. The court be-
lieved that no average reader would remember the minor subplot
in which her "character" had a place.'" On the other hand, the
court believed that anyone familiar with the actual trial would
easily identify the fictional characters with their real-life counter-
parts.""9 The question the opinion raises is whether the promi-
nence of the character should influence the decision regarding "of
and concerning."
The Wheeler court used the words "reasonable" and."average"
interchangeably in describing the hypothetical reader whose re-
sponse determines the result. In fact, though, the court relied on
the average reader. The resulting test is more protective of the
defendant writer. Under a "reasonable reader" test, the test
adopted by the Restatement,190 a reasonable identification of
plaintiff and character by any reader will suffice. The "average
reader" test imposes a greater burden on the plaintiff. Not only
must he prove that the identification is reasonable, he also must
prove that many people would make the connection. That distinc-
tion was quite significant in Wheeler, for the court concluded that
185. See supra notes 140-54 and accompanying text.
186. See Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1962).
187. Id. The book was a study of an actual murder trial through fiction, and the names
had been changed. Id. at 375.
188. Id. at 376. Accord Levey v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 57 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
189. Wzeeler, 300 F.2d at 375.




the character at issue was too inconsequential for the average
reader to remember. 9'
The court also addressed the reasonableness issue in a manner
unlike that of other courts whose decisions are discussed in this
article. The Wheeler court concluded that an identification of the
character Janice Quill with the plaintiff would be unreasonable,
even by those who knew her. The reason: the plaintiff denied hav-
ing any of the "unsavory characteristics" of the character. 92 So,
by alleging that the "representation" was untrue and defamatory,
the plaintiff proved the defendant's case-that the character was
not "of and concerning" her. This is what writers of fiction have
argued all along, but very few courts have accepted the reasoning.
The Wheeler approach, then, works well for the writer of the
roman a clef and perhaps offers some solace to authors of fiction-
alizations. True, the colloquium is clear, but would the average
reader reasonably believe that a book labeled "fiction" contained
any information meant to be taken as true? By analogy to
Wheeler, the more the plaintiff contends it is not true, the less
likely it could be taken seriously. If that is so, the plaintiff's repu-
tation has not been besmirched. This may be considered a nega-
tion of defamation 9 s or of damage,' 94 but in any event it leads to a
verdict for the defendant. Whether trial judges will find such a
subtle argument sufficient to grant a summary judgment for the
defendant, however, is questionable.
Whether fictionalization or fiction, the core question remains
the same: should such writing be considered fact or fiction for
legal purposes? If fiction, should writers be required to label it as
such 95 and what standard of liability should be used? If fact, how
191. Wheeler, 300 F.2d at 376.
192. The character was described in the book as "that dame with the dyed red hair and
livid scar on her right cheek who had sworn at him in everything but Arabian ... a noisy
foul-mouthed harridan." Id. Cf. Lyons v. New Am. Library, 6 MEDiA L. REP. (BNA) 2081
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (novel based on "Son of Sam" murder investigation that referred to
"this quiff in Malone" not considered to be "of and concerning" county sheriff in Malone,
New York who admitted that he did not participate in the investigation).
193. Prosser suggests that if the words were given some other meaning than the obvious
one by the recipient, defamation may be said to be absent; however, he also says that ab-
sence of belief may not be controlling. The fact that such words concerning the plaintiff
are circulating in any form, he says, must have injured the plaintiff's reputation to some
extent. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 746.
194. Absence of belief in the veracity of the words, Prosser says, at least will affect
damages. Id.
195. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text. Proper labeling might change the
reader's expectations; on the other hand, it could be considered to be nothing more than a
subterfuge. The latter view was expressed by the attorney for the plaintiff in Pring v.
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much, if any, artistic license should be allowed? When does some-
thing cross the fine line between fact and fiction? 19
The author of a work of fiction under the currently accepted
test is placed in an untenable position. He must choose one of two
paths. He can admit that the fictitious character is the plaintiff
and argue that he did not know or have serious doubt about the
false characterization. Or, he can deny that the character is the
plaintiff, in which case the author, in effect, admits "actual mal-
ice" as defined by the majority in Bindrim. In the next section,
we propose an alternative-a return to the normal meaning of
malice as the measure of fault.
VI
The Solution: Clear and Convincing Evidence of
"Subterfuge" and "Malice"
The most simple, precise, and predictable approach to the prob-
lem of libel in works of fiction is also probably the most unaccept-
able: refuse to consider anything in fiction as libelous.197 Despite
the inevitable objections, this solution can fit conveniently within
the existing framework of the Restatement of Torts. Relying on a
work of fiction as the source for any statement of fact simply
would be considered "unreasonable.""'
Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 7 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1101 (D. Wyo. 1981), in oral argument on
appeal. "Someone writes fiction," he said, "and then hides behind the statement so they
can write whatever they want against anybody." See Tenth Circuit Hears Appeal of $14
Million Libel Verdict, 7 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2208 (1981). See also supra notes 60-88 for a
discussion of Pring. Proper labeling, however, is made problematic by the belief of some
people, such as writer E.L. Doctorow, that "there is no longer any such thing as fiction or
nonfiction; there's only narrative." See Hoffman, Limitations on the Right of Publicity, 28
BULL COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 111, 127 n.87 (1980).
196. The recent film Missing involves the factual story of the death of a young Ameri-
can in Chile. The film suggests that an American official might have encouraged the pro-
tagonist's death. As a result, the United States Ambassador to Chile at the time and
another State Department official sued for defamation. See Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 10 ME-
DIA L. REP. (BNA) 2484 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See also Missing: Fact or Fabrication?, TIME, Mar.
8, 1982, at 96. The film makers concede that at least some of the facts in the film were
altered for dramatic effect. The responsibility for the young American's death, however,
remains a matter of speculation. Id. The district court dismissed charges against the pub-
lisher of the book on which the film is based, but refused to dismiss the case against the
film director. 10 MEDIA L. REP. at 2489.
197. This solution has been advanced by one student author. See Comment, Defama-
tion in Fiction: The Case for Absolute First Amendment Protection, 29 AM. U.L. REv. 571,
592-93 (1980). Cy. Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and a
Proposal, 18 U.S.F.L. REV. 1, 22-28 (1983)(discussion of absolute first amendment protection
for non-fiction).
198. See aupra note 127.
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Chief Justice Rose Bird of the California Supreme Court al-
luded to this idea in Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Produc-
tions,' a case primarily concerned with the right of publicity.
Justice Bird stated:
[I]n defamation cases, the concern is with defamatory lies mas-
querading as truth. In contrast, the author who denotes his work
as fiction proclaims his literary license and indifference to "the
facts." There is no pretense. All fiction, by definition, eschews an
obligation to be faithful to historical truth. Every fiction writer
knows his creation is in some sense "false.
'20°
Justice Bird's concurrence in Guglielmi was cited in Miss
America Pageant, Inc. v. Penthouse International, Ltd.,201 a com-
panion case to Pring, not to disapprove of the case but rather to
distinguish it. Guglielmi involved a television program clearly de-.
noted as fiction. The Penthouse article about a Miss Wyoming in
Miss America Pageant, Inc., in contrast, was labeled as humor.
The inference is that with proper labeling, the Miss Wyoming arti-
cle would have been insulated from attack.o2
Such an approach has much to offer. It certainly protects the
rights of authors who legitimately draw upon the world around
them. Moreover, it has the potential for changing the way in
which people look at works of fiction. In the current climate, one
may well wonder if the contents of a novel are meant to be taken
as true. If the legal system, however, were to refuse to take any-
thing labeled "fiction" as a representation of fact, the public might
well respond by looking for less fact in the pages of fiction.
Nevertheless, state legislatures and courts will probably not
adopt such a definitive solution. Rather, it seems likely that they
will prefer to balance the interests of authors and individuals.
This is not undesirable. The central threat to the first amendment
still remains the prior restraint.
Viscerally, judges react strongly to aggrieved parties who have
no remedies. If the damage remedy-no matter how restricted-is
taken away from the libel plaintiff in fiction cases, the temptation
to issue an injunction prior to publication will increase. Our con-
stitutional system has always contemplated a virtual prohibition
against prior restraint, but at the same time holds a publisher re-
199. 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979).
200. Id. at 871, 603 P.2d at 459, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 359 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
201. 524 F. Supp. 1280, 1285 (D.N.J. 1981).
202. Miss America Pooean Inc. was decided in the defendant's favor because the plain-
tiff failed to prove New York Times malice. Id. at 2183. Pring, however, reached a contrary
result. See supra notes 60-88 and accompanying text.
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sponsible for "abusive" publication after the fact. To tamper with
this delicate balance in such a way at this late date seems
unwise.2o
Thus, we turn to the solution previously mentioned: redefining
the "fault" requirement in a fiction context so as to give breathing
room to artistic creativity, while at the same time protecting po-
tential plaintiffs from a potentially libelous publication. There is,
of course, little doubt that the full measure of first amendment
protections apply to works of fiction.' Thus, the novelist and his
publisher must be found to be at "fault" in publishing a defama-
tory matter about a plaintiff. The rationale of New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan suggests that the "fault" standard for fiction
should be defined as follows: the plaintiff must produce clear and
convincing evidence (1) that the defendant intentionally used the
fiction device as a subterfuge to defame the plaintiff, and (2) that
he did so with malice in its ordinary meaning-that is, with ha-
tred, ill-will, or spite.m
We have seen that "fault" as defined in non-fiction cases is vir-
tually useless in the fiction context. The first amendment re-
quires protection of the creative process, while at the same time
providing a damage remedy to the party who has been aggrievedly
abused. The Corrigan case,'03 provides an example of a fictitious
work where the author was at "fault" under the test set forth
above and where the plaintiff should recover.
In Corrigan, a New York City magistrate, Joseph E. Corrigan,
sued the publisher of a novel that critically described a magistrate
named Cornigan.&°7 Both character and plaintiff presided over the
Jefferson Market Court in New York. Cornigan, however, was
portrayed as being "ignorant, brutal, hypocritical, corrupt,
203. Another proposed solution is raised in Note, "Clear and Convincing"Libe" Fiction
and the Law of Defamation, 92 YALE LJ. 520 (1983), in which the author suggests a three-
part test focusing on the "of and concerning" element of the libel cause of action. As we
have argued, the "of and concerning" question is typically left to the jury's discretion, no
matter what instructions accompany the submission of the charge. It is Improper and un-
wise to focus the first amendment issue on this traditionally common law concept, espe-
cially given the jury's difficulty in grasping the nature of the artistic process involved in the
creation of fictitious characters.
204. See Franklin & Trager, supra note 16, at 217-18.
205. Another commentator has proposed a similar solution for Canada. See Madott, Li-
bel Law, filion, and the Character, 21 OsGooDE HALL L.J. 741, 778 (1983).
206. Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920).
207. The novel was entitled God's Man and depicts the adventures of a central character
in New York's underworld. Id. at 62,126 N.E. at 262. The lawsuit that was filed against the
publisher turned on whether the author's knowledge of the libelous nature of his book
could be imputed to the publishing company. Id. at 65-71, 126 N.E. at 264-65.
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shunned by his fellows, bestial of countenance, unjust, dominated
by political influences in making decisions, and grossly unfit for
his place."'
The similarity of the names and the positions betrays a readily
discernable intent on the part of the author to vilify Judge Corri-
gan. 2W In Corrigan, however, the concealment was not even art-
ful. In fact, the author apparently had appeared before the actual
judge and had intended to get even with him by means of his
book.210 Consequently, Corrigan stands apart from the large body
of instances in which writers draw upon real life as a source of
inspiration and do not use the fiction device to damage a person
and escape liability.
211
Liability in Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill is certainly not inconsis-
tent with the first amendment. As the United States Supreme
Court said in Garrison v. Louisiana:
2
M
[Tihe use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the
premises of democratic government and with the orderly manner
in which economic, social, or political change is to be effected. Cal-
culated falsehood falls into that class of utterances which are "no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight so-
cial value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality .... 213
The author who uses the fiction vehicle as a subterfuge in order
to "get" the plaintiff does not measure up to first amendment
standards and thus may be held liable. He has not used the person
to advance his creative efforts, but rather has perverted the fiction
label to take cover from the scrutiny applied to non-fiction. This
test will catch only a relatively small number of publications, and
that is how it should be. Providing breathing space for writers re-
sults in broader reading space for all of us.
The first amendment protection in the non-fiction case--at least
with respect to public figures and officials-protects the "inno-
cent" mistake. By following the test we have proposed, the "inno-
cent" mistake will be protected while imposing liability for the
208. Id. at 63, 126 N.E. at 262.
209. The table of contents, in fact, lists the relevant chapter as "Justice-a la Corigan,"
but the heading in the body of the book spells the name "Cornigan." Id. at 63, 126 N.E. at
262.
210. Id. at 68, 126 N.E. at 264.
211. See supra notes 19-59 and accompanying text.
212. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
213. Id. at 75 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
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calculated, intentional defamation. Our test likewise solves the
thorny problem of "what is fiction?" If the defendant claims that
his work is fiction, the jury is permitted to determine whether the
author used that device as a subterfuge to defame the plaintiff.
In reality, the test we propose is a compromise born of the fact
that absolute immunity for works of fiction is unlikely to be en-
acted. Short of such absolute immunity, however, we believe that
blame should be placed only on those who are blameworthy. In
works of non-fiction, the actual malice requirement increases the
protection given to authors. As misapplied to fiction, the standard
has reduced the degree of protection afforded authors. Thus,
rather than transplanting the concept to foreign soil, the courts
should fashion a constitutional test that allows fiction to flower. A
return to the traditional meaning of malice would accomplish that
goal, benefitting those who grow works of fiction as well as those
of us who admire the garden.

